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NOTES 
The Constitutionality of the 1972 Amendment to Title VIl's 
Exemption for Religions Organizations 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment 
discrimination on the basis of religion.1 Prior to 1972 this ban did 
not apply to the hiring of individuals to perform work connected 
with the "religious activities" of a "religious corporation, associa-
tion, or society."2 In 1972 the exemption was broadened to include 
all of the activities of such organizations.8 The constitutionality of 
the broadened exemption was questioned by the United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Kinfts GardenJ Inc. v. 
Federal Communications Commission.4 
King's Garden, a nonprofit, interdenominational religious or-
ganization dedicated _to spreading Christianity, is the licensee of 
two radio stations in Edmonds, Washington.ti The Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC) found that King's Garden was dis-
criminating on religious grounds and ordered submission of a 
statement of future hiring practices and policies.6 King's Garden 
sought review of the FCC order, contending that the exemption 
contained in title VII established a national policy that should. 
control the mandate of the FCC to regulate broadcasters as public 
convenience, interest, or necessity requires. 7 The court refused to 
I. "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer- (I) to fail or 
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or othenvise to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em• 
ployment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin •• , ," 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a) (1970). 
2. "This title shall not apply ••• to a religious corporation, association, or society 
with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work 
connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association or society of its reli-
gious activities or to an educational institution with respect to the employment of 
individuals to perform work connected with the educational activities of such institu-
tion." Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 702, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 25, as amended, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-I (Supp. II, 1972). The fair employment practices laws of some states 
still contain exemptions substantially the same as the original federal exemption. E.g., 
IDAHO CODE § 67-5910(1) (1973); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 344:.090(2) (1970). 
3. "This title shall not apply ••• to a religious corporation, association, educational 
institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular 
religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, associa-
tion, educational institution, or society of its activities.'' Equal Opportunities Act ol 
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 3, 86 Stat. 103, amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I (1970) (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l (Supp. II, 1972)). Similar exemptions are contained in some 
state fair employment practices legislation. E.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN, § 41-1462 (Supp. 
1974); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 20 (Supp. 1974). 
4. 498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3274 (U.S. Nov. 11, 1974). 
5. 498 F.2d at 52. 
6. 498 F.2d at 52. 
7. 498 F.2d at 53 n.4. 0~ the mandate of the FCC, see, for example, 42 U.S.C, 
§§ 303, 307, 309(a) (1970). 
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"engraft the 1972 exemption onto the Comn:tlssion;s rules';8 
because of concern that the exemption violated the establishment 
clause of the first amendment and the equal protection guarantee of 
the fifth amendment, and because ". . . Congress ha[ d] given abso~ 
lutely no indication that it wished to impose the exemption upon 
the FCC."9 The court held that the FCC's more limited exception, 
allowing religious discrimination only 1\Tith respect to "the hiring of 
persons whose work is . . . connected with the espousal of the 
licensee's religious views,"10 was broad enough to protect the rights 
of King's Garden under the free exercise clause of the first amend-
ment.11 
Because the court held the title VII exemption inapplicable, its 
discussion of the exemption's constitutionality is only dictum. 
Nevertheless, concern over the exemption's constitutionality may 
have influenced the court's holding, and Chief Judge Bazelon based 
his concurrence solely on his agreement 1\Tith the majority that the 
exemption was a violation of the establishment clause of the first 
amendment.12 
This note 1\Till examine the constitutionality of the title VII 
exemption for religious associations, focusing on the extent to which 
the exemption is required by the free exercise clause and the extent 
to which it must be limited to avoid conflict with the establishment 
clause.18 The religion clauses will be considered solely in the con-
text of the private business sector;· this note will not consider the 
possibility that the establishment clause would require a narrower 
8. 498 F.2d at 53. 
9. 498 F.2d at 53. Looking at legislative history, the court held that the title VII 
exemption was intended to immunize only "those activities which had been tradi-
tionally free of all government regulation"; that broadcasters are not trnly private in-
stitutions, but rather "public trustees" subject to many "FCC-imposed obligations 
inapplicable to the private sector generally"; and that there was no evidence that Con-
gress wished "to upset this well-established doctrine." 498 F.2d at 59. 
10. 498 F.2d at 59, quoting Anderson, M F.C.C.2d 937-38, 24 P &: F RADIO REG. 2D 
281-82 (1972). 
11. 498 F.2d at 60. The court acknowledged that if, in applying its exemption, the 
FCC were to construe the terms "espousal" and "religious views" in an overly narrow 
fashion, King's Garden's first amendment rights might be infringed, 498 F.2d at 60, 
but the application point was not before the court. 498 F .2d at 59. 
For an example of the FCC's interpretation of its rule, see National Religious 
Broadcasters, Inc., 43 F.C.C.2d 451, 27 P &: F RADIO REG. 2D 875 (1973). 
12. 498 F.2d at 61. 
13. The argument raised by the King's Garden court, 498 F.2d at 57, that the ex-
emption violates the equal protection guarantee of the fifth amendment, cf. Bolling 
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954), by discriminating between religious and secular or-
ganizations does not seem to deepen the analysis. An exemption that satisfies the con-
flicting requirements of the first amendment shonld not be subject to fifth amendment 
attack; in an area where the free exercise and establishment clauses point in opposite 
directions, the free exercise foundation for such an exemption should justify the statu-
tory discrimination as long as the exemption does not contravene the establishment 
clause. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 44:9 n.14 (1971). 
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exemption for a quasi-public institution, such as a broadcast licensee 
or a religious association receiving public funds.14 
Without some exemption, title VII's proscription on religious 
discrimination in employment would clearly infringe on the free 
exercise of religion. A Baptist congregation, for example, would be 
prevented from discriminating on the basis of religion in hiring its 
minister. Such a prohibition would contravene the Supreme Court's 
holding that the free exercise clause prohibits the state from regu-
lating "church administration, the operation of churches, [or] the 
appointment of clergy."10 Moreover, state regulation of the church-
minister relationship could violate the establishment clause by in-
volving government too deeply in the affairs of religious organiza-
tions.16 In McClure v. Salvation Army,11 a Salvation Army officer 
charged that organization with sex discrimination. Finding that her 
position was equivalent to that of a minister, the court held that 
title VII does not apply to a church-minister employment relation-
ship because a contrary interpretation would raise serious constitu-
tional problems by causing "the State to intrude upon matters of 
church administration and government which have so many times 
before been proclaimed to be matters of singular ecclesiastical con-
cern."18 It is also clear that government cannot forbid racial dis-
crimination in the employment of clergy.19 It is not clear, however, 
whether the complete immunity from governmental regulation ex-
tends to employees other than priests, ministers, rabbis, and other 
religious leaders whose selection is of vital importance to the prac-
tice of an organization's religion. 
With regard to such other employees, the free exercise clause 
and the establishment clause seem to pose conflicting requirements 
for state regulation of religious employment discrimination.20 The 
King's Garden court found that the original title VII exemption-
14. See generally Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Note, Public Control o/ 
Private Sectarian Institutions Receiving Public Funds, 63 MiCH. L, REY. 142 (1964), 
15. Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in North 
America, 344 U.S. 94, 107 (1952). 
_16. Cf. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. l, 16 (1947). 
17. 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied because petition not timely filed, 409 U.S. 
896 (1972). 
18. 460 F.2d at 560. 
19, Bonfield, The Substance of American Fair Employment Practices Legislation I: 
Employers, 61 Nw. U. L. REv. 907, 934-35 (1967). See Simpson v. Wells Lamont Corp., 
494 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974). While filibustering against the Equal Employment Op-
portunities Act of 1972, Senator Ervin contended that subjecting religious organiza-
tions to any of the strictures of title VII would violate the constitutional command of 
separation of church and state, Il8 CoNG, REc. 1977-91 (1972). 
20. The tension between the two clauses has often been recognized. See, e.g., Com-
mittee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788 (1973); Wiscon-
sin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970); 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,416 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring), 
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permitting discrimination in the hiring of individuals to perform 
work connected with the religious activities of a religious associa-
tion-satisfied the conflicting requirements of the two clauses.21 It 
is submitted that the court's dictum underestimates the extent to 
which government proscription of religious discrimination inter-
feres with the free exercise of religion and overestimates the extent 
to which the- 1972 exemption establishes religion. 
Religious discrimination by a sect in hiring persons for nonreli-
gious activities may assist its members in practicing their faith or 
spreading the sect's doctrine. For example, suppose a small sect has 
been losing membership because its adherents spend all of their 
time, except for one hour of biweekly worship, in a society domi-
nated by secularism and competing religions. The sect might open 
a factory for the purpose of employing its adherents and enabling 
them to work with coreligionists in an atmosphere conducive to 
preserving their faith. Or a religious sect running a secular business, 
and not generally discriminating with respect to religion in its 
hiring, might nevertheless have a work force composed primarily 
of adherents of that sect. In order to protect the faith of its em-
ployees, it may desire to discriminate against job applicants whose 
religious beliefs require them to proselytize their fellow workers.22 
The business activity involved in each example, especially the 
second, is not easily characterized as religious. Yet extending free 
exercise clause protection may be appropriate. Although the first 
amendment gives no religion the right to governmental aid in keep-
ing its adherents segregated from the intellectual ferment and 
dialogue of the outside world,23 a religious organization has a legiti-
mate interest in using its mrn resources to shield its members from 
the importunities of the secular world or of competing faiths.24 
Today a religion may find it exceedingly difficult to isolate its mem-
21. 498 F.2d at 56. 
22. In passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress may have intended to allow 
religious discrimination in this situation. See EEOC, LEGISLATIVE H1sroRY OF TITLES 
VII AND IX OF CIVIL RIGHTS Acr OF 1964, at 3208 (1968) (remarks of Congressman 
Whitten). Such defensive use of religious discrimination may often arise in situations 
in which it is difficult to term the activity involved "religious," but in which a free 
exercise right is clearly involved. 
23. CJ. Committee for Pub. Educ. &: Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 
(1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
24. CJ. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). See also Note, Abduction, Religious 
Sects, and the Free Exercise Clause, 25 SYRACUSE L. REv. 623, 635-36 (1974). 
An individual proprietor might wish to hire only adherents of his faith for the 
same reasons. Free exercise would thus seem to require an exemption for individuals 
as well as for religious organizations. The failure of Congress to grant such an exemp-
tion may be no more than an oversight of a situation that rarely occurs. Religions do 
not commonly require their adherents not to hire members of another faith. See 
Stark &: Glock, Prejudice and the Churches, in PREJUDICE U.S.A. 70 (C. Glock &: E. 
Siegelman eds. 1969). Also, many proprietorships will not be covered by title VII be-
cause they have fewer than 15 employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (Supp. II, 1972). 
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hers, but it would seem that it has lost some freedom-a type of 
freedom that can only be denominated "religious"-if in order to 
comply with title VII it is forced to hire those who would proselytize 
against it. 
In addition, a religious sect may wish to use secular activities as 
a means of spreading its influence. For example, a religious group 
might wish to employ only members of its mvn sect in a laundry 
operated as a showcase of faith.25 While this motive will seldom be 
the sole reason for operating a commercial establishment, it is prob-
ably not uncommon for a religious organization to desire that its 
members witness their faith or conduct themselves in a manner that 
will reflect credit upon the religion in the public eye.26 The King's 
Garden court mentioned a professional football club as one activity 
of a religious group that would not be entitled to the protection of 
the free exercise clause.27 Yet a nondenominational religious orga-
nization might sponsor a basketball team composed entirely of 
players and coaches deeply committed to their religion. By having 
the team play local teams throughout" the country and by publicizing 
the religious sponsorship and composition of the team, the organiza-
tion might hope to counter any notion young people may have that 
religion is only for effeminate persons. To cover expenses, or even 
to make a pro.fit, such a team might charge spectators a fee. 
Whether or not these undertakings are "religious activities," the 
religious discrimination in each case is motivated by a desire to 
facilitate the exercise or spread of the organization's faith. If the free 
exercise clause protects actions taken by a religious organization to 
effectuate these purposes, it should protect the employment dis-
crimination in the foregoing examples regardless of the specific 
nature of the activity. 
It has been argued that the free exercise clause protects only 
actions essential to or required by the particular faith involved.28 
Such a limitation is unjustifiable.29 The distinction between actions 
25. The business involved in Golden Rule Church Assn. v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 
719 (1964), seems to have been started solely for this reason. 
26. Such a desire was apparently one factor motivating the religious discrimina-
tion in King's Garden. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 20-21. 
27. 498 F .2d at 54. 
28. Comment, The Lord Buildeth and the State Taketh Away-Church Condemna• 
tion and the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 46 CoLO. L. REv. 43, 48-50 &: 
n.53 (1974). 
29. Unitarian Church West v. McConnell, 337 F. Supp. 1252, 1257 (E.D. Wis. 1972), 
affd. mem., 474 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds sub nom. McCon• 
nell v. Unitarian Church West, 416 U.S. 932 (1974) (upholding the right of a church 
to use explicit visual aids in teaching sex education to young adherents); M. KoNVITZ, 
RELIGIOUS LIDERTY AND CONSCIENCE 77-79 (1968); Marcus, The Forum of Conscience: 
Applying Standards Under the Free Exerdse Clause, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1217, 1250•51 
(1974). 
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that are compelled by one's religious beliefs and actions that merely 
facilitate the practice of one's religion is impossible to maintain, 
especially with respect to religions that stress the importance of 
individual conscience. Although most cases extending constitutional 
protection to proselytization80 have involved Jehovah's Witnesses, 
for whom proselytization is an important religious tenet,81 that 
factor does not seem to have been essential to the decisions.82 Indeed, 
if proselytization were protected only for persons whose religion 
required it, it could be argued that the state would be aiding the 
work of such religions against those that do not make propagation 
of the faith an essential element of religious belief and practice. 
Such aid would violate the establishment clause by "prefer[ring] 
one religion over another."88 
The free exercise clause thus seems to cover employment prac-
tices designed to facilitate proselytization.84 If free exercise extends 
that far, it certainly also covers employment practices designed to 
prevent adherents from breaking away from their faith or to enable 
The importance to the religion of a given practice might be relevant in balancing 
the individual right of free exercise against a state interest advanced to justify over-
riding the individual right. Shetreet, Exemptions and Privileges on Grounds of Reli-
gion and Consdence, 62 KY. L.J. 377, 416-17 (1974). See also text at notes 35-37 infra. 
30. E.g., Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); Murdock v. Pennsyl-
vania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943). 
31. H. STROUP, THE JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES 60-67 (1945). 
32. Indeed, this factor was not mentioned by the Court in Follett v. Town of Mc-
Cormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944), or in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943). 
Rather, the Court stated that it was protecting a "method of disseminating religious 
beliefs" from being "crushed." 319 U.S. at 155. 
33. Everson v. 13oard of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). Although religious exemptions 
have been granted that, as a practical matter, do not benefit all sects equally, e.g., 
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971), whatever aid such exemptions give does 
not directly affect the competition between sects for adherents. 
34. Religious discrimination in employment might have more than one motivation, 
but the free exercise clause should cover such discrimination as long as any of the 
motives sufficient to cause the discrimination merit protection. 
There are types of proselytization that free exercise does not protect. The state may 
of course prohibit physically coercive methods of proselytization, such as kidnapping 
and torture, because of its compelling interest in ensuring the physical safety of its 
citizens. Cf. text at notes 35-37 infra. Economically coercive proselytization presents a 
harder problem. For example, a religiously affiliated hospital might hire only adher-
ents of its faith in order to use its economic power as a major employer to induce 
the local labor force to adopt its faith. The hospital's claim to free exercise protec-
tion should not be dismissed on the ground that such proselytization can produce only 
sham conversions. Free exercise would mean little if the government were free to reg-
ulate proselytization whenever it believes the methods chosen axe ineffective. On the 
one hand, it has been suggested that the activities of missionaries in underdeveloped 
countries in establishing schools, hospitals, and clinics may sometimes be a form of 
bribery that should not be legally protected. A. K.rusHNASWAMI, A STUDY OF DISCRIM-
INATION IN nm MATIER OF RELIGIOUS RlGIITS AND PRACTICES 40 (1960). On the other 
hand, it is difficult to find a reasonable means of distinguishing the economic coercion 
practiced by the hospital from economically coercive activities that probably should 
be protected, such as the dispensation of charity. 
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members of a sect to practice their religion more effectively. These 
motivations, however, arguably underlie every activity of a religious 
organization. It is possible, therefore, to argue that free exercise 
requires the full scope of the amended title VII exemption. 
This is not to say that free exercise clause coverage ensures con-
stitutional protection. The state may have overriding interests. By 
broadening the title VII exemption to include all activities of reli-
gious associations, Congress has chosen not to assert any state 
interest that might justify infringing on free exercise. Nevertheless, 
in discussing the extent to which free exercise requires an exemp-
tion to title VII, it is necessary to take into account the state inter-
ests that can justify imposing a burden on free exercise. The order 
of magnitude such state interests must assume has been described as 
"compelling"85 and "of the highest order."86 They are not measured 
against an abstract standard, but balanced against the religious 
interest involved; thus, the strength of the state interest necessary to 
justify an intrusion upon religious belief, practice, or propagation 
will vary with the degree to which those interests are endangered.87 
There are several interests a state might advance by enacting a 
general ban on religious discrimination. It might be argued that a 
worker's religious beliefs are generally irrelevant to his job per-
formance, 88 and that a ban on religious discrimination therefore has 
an economic rationale because hiring based on criteria irrelevant to 
productivity detracts from over-all economic production.89 In addi-
tion, the state arguably has an interest in creating a society in which 
every individual is free to exercise his belief unhampered by private, 
as well as governmental, discrimination.40 The concomitant infringe-
ment of the individual's right to discriminate as he pleases might be 
justified by the belief that a just society fosters good public morale 
and avoids the danger of civilian insurrection. 
None of these state interests appear to be sufficiently compelling 
35. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963). 
36. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). But see Johnson v. Robison, 415 
U.S. 361, 384 (1974); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 462 (1971) (suggesting that 
"substantial" interests are sufficient). 
37. See People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 724-25, 394 P.2d 813, 820, 40 Cal. Rptr. 
69, 76 (1964); Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L. R.Ev. 327, 345 
(1969}; Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development: 
Part I, The Religious Liberty Guarantee, BO HARv. L. R.Ev. 1381, 1390 (1967); Note, 
supra note 24, at 634. Quite a few factors can enter into the balancing. See Clark, su• 
pra; Shetreet, supra note 29, at 410-19. 
38. Title VII does recognize that sex and religion may sometimes be relevant, how• 
ever. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e} (1970). 
39. This argument apparently was not made to Congress in the debate over title 
VII. See text at notes 41-42 infra. 
40. Cf. Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971) (en bane} (Congress has 
power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment to punish private conspiracies to 
interfere with freedom of worship). 
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to justify prohibiting private religious discrimination practiced for 
the purpose of furthering an employer's exercise of religion. First, 
the fact that Congress broadened the title VII exemption in 1972 
suggests that Congress did not find these interests compelling. Nor 
does the legislative history of the original title VII enacted in 1964 
reveal any congressional belief that compelling state interests justi-
fied the narrower exemption, which did not protect private religious 
discrimination for the purpose of furthering individual exercise or 
propagation of religion unless it was part of a "religious activity." 
Almost no attention was directed to the ban on religious discrimina-
tion when title VII was passed.41 Second, in the hearings on the 1964 
bill, the House Judiciary Committee did not find substantial evi-
dence that religious discrimination in employment was a major 
social problem.42 The lack of such evidence weak.ens the force of the 
state interest in promoting a just society. Finally, it is probable that 
neither state interest extends to situations in which religion is rele-
vant to the legitimate purposes of the employer. 
Absent a compelling state interest, free exercise requires an 
exemption in title VII at least for employment discrimination 
designed to facilitate the exercise or spread of religion. The original 
title VII exemption for "religious activities" was therefore too 
narrow, and the 1972 amendment exempting all activities of a reli-
gious organization perhaps goes beyond what the free exercise clause 
requires, although there are probably few activities covered by the 
broadened exemption that are not constitutionally protected.43 This 
note will now examine the constitutionality of the broadened 
exemption under the establishment clause. 
The Supreme Court's most recent formulation of the standards 
governing establishment clause challenges is found in Committee 
for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,44 in which 
the Court invalidated several-forms of state aid to parochial schools. 
The Court stated that "to pass muster under the Establishment 
Clause the law in question, first, must reflect a clearly secular legis-
lative purpose ... , second, must have a primary effect that neither 
advances nor inhibits religion ... , and, third, must avoid excessive 
government entanglement with religion . . . .''45 The title VII 
exemption easily satisfies the third prong of the test because it 
avoids any governmental regulation of a religious organization's 
employment practices. But the Kings Garden court found that the 
41. Edwards &: Kaplan, Reiigious Discrimination and the Role of Arbitration Un-
der Title VII, 69 MICH. L. REv. 599, 600 (1971). 
42. Id. at 600 n.10. 
43. See text following note 34 supra. 
44. 413 U.S. 756 (1973). 
45. 413 U.S. at 773 (citations omitted). A similar standard, couched in somewhat 
different language, was set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). 
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broadened exemption failed to satisfy the other two prongs of the 
standard. 
With respect to the first prong, the court was unable to "con-
ceive what secular purpose is served by the unbounded exemption 
enacted in 1972."46 Because the subject matter of both the title VII 
proscription and the exemption is religious, the characterization 
of the purposes behind the exemption as religious is understandable. 
However, a less literal view would include as a secular purpose the 
state's purpose of avoiding the imposition of burdens on the prac-
tice of religion, whether or not such government noninvolvement 
is required by the free exercise clause. The state might desire com-
plete noninvQlvement in order to avoid any unintentional infringe• 
ment of free exercise rights or excessive litigation of infringement 
claims. If these were the goals of the title VII exemption, the secular 
purpose test would be satisfied. 
The secular purpose test is also less of a stumbling block if it is 
interpreted in light of the phrasing of Epperson v. Arkansas,47 the 
last Supreme Court decision prior to Nyquist based squarely on the 
purpose test. Epperson makes the purpose to advance or inhibit 
religion the key factor.48 The title VII exemption apparently was 
intended to neutralize the impact of title VII on religious practice, 
rather than to advance religion.49 Neutralization of governmental 
regulation implies neither advancement nor inhibition of religion. 
Although it may sometimes be difficult to distinguish between ad-
vancement of religion and avoidance of restrictions on religious 
,exercise, religion-based exemptions to other general statutory 
schemes have been upheld.50 Therefore the exemption by itself does 
not so advance religion as to run afoul of the primary purpose test. 
The King's Garden court found that the title VII exemption 
fails under the second prong of the Nyquist standard, the primary 
effect test, because it puts religious organizations in a privileged 
position with respect to other employers.61 However, the distinction 
discussed in the context of the secular purpose test is also applicable 
46. 498 F.2d at 55. The secular purpose test is examined in Choper, The Establish-
ment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 260, 277-83 (1968), 
47. 393 U.S. 97 (1968). Epperson grounded the decision to strike down a statute 
squarely on the secular purpose test, whereas Nyquist found adequate nonsectarian 
state purposes and rested on the primary effect test. Thus the phrasing of the secular 
purpose ~est in Epperson is perhaps a more appropriate gauge of the Court's meaning. 
48. 393 U.S. at 107. 
49. 118 CONG. R.Ec. 2311, 4503 (1972) (remarks by Senators Spong and Ervin). 
50. See; e.g., Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664, 672-73 (1970); United States v. 
Branigan, 299 F. Supp. 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (exemption from draft for ministers): 
Commonwealth v. Arlan's Dept. Store, 357 S.W.2d 703 (Ky.), dismissed for want of 
substantial federal question sub nom. Arlan's Dept. Store v. Kentucky, 371 U.S. 218 
(1962) (exemption from Sunday closing law for Saturday Sabbath observers). 
51. 498 F.2d at 55. 
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here: It can be argued that the effect of the exemption is to neutral-
ize the impact of title VII on religious exercise rather than to 
advance religion. The exemption does permit religious employers to 
do something that is forbidden to secular employers, but it is not 
easy to decide whether it confers a sufficiently substantial benefit 
on religious employers that religion is thereby "advanced."52 An-
other mode of analysis is required to decide this difficult questi~n. 
Indeed, the Nyquist test may be inapplicable to cases dealing 
with · exemptions from statutory burdens. The test was developed 
in cases involving direct state aid to religious organizations,53 and 
much of the judicial explication of the test does not seem to be 
transferable to exemptions.54 The Nyquist test was ignored in 
Wisconsin v. Yoder,55 in which the Court fashioned a judicial 
52. At least in parochial aid cases, the primary effect test is violated if the effect 
of advancing religion is significant, regardless of the relative strength of other effects. 
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 774 (majority 
opinion), 823 (White, J., dissenting) (1973); Morgan, The Establishment Clause and 
Sectarian Schools: A. Final Installment?, 1973 SUP. Cr. REv. 57, 78-79 (1974). In exemp• 
tion cases, one might argue that the effect of advancing religion must predominate 
before the exemption fails. 
53. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious 
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); Levitt 
v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973); Tilton v. Rich• 
ardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Tests similar to 
one or more of the Nyquist prongs have been used in various cases not involving fi. 
nancial aid. E.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968); School Dist. of Abing• 
ton Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 
402, 445, 453 (1961). 
54. Consider, for example, the following recent explanation of the primary effect 
test: "Aid normally may be thought to have a primary effect of advancing religion 
when it flows to an institution in which religion is so pervasive that a substantial por• 
tion of its functions are subsumed in the religious mission or when it funds a specifi• 
cally religious activity in an otherwise substantially secular setting." Hunt v. McNair, 
413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973). By contrast, as the King's Garden court recognized, 498 F.2d 
at 56, the case for holding the religious discrimination exemption unconstitutional 
gains strength rather than weakens as the institutions to which the exemption applies 
engage in essentially secular activities separable from religious functions. 
55. 406 U.S. 205, 220-21 (1972). Although Yoder was decided before Nyquist, the 
Court had already announced a substantially similar version of the Nyquist test in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The holding that the establishment clause 
issues were made irrelevant by the overriding requirements of the free exercise clause 
may explain the Court's failure to use the Nyquist/Lemon test in Yoder. 
Chief Justice Burger has warned against mechanical application of the language of 
one case with respect to the religion clauses to a new fact situagon: 
In attempting to articulate the scope of the two Religion Clauses, the Court's 
opinions reflect the limitations inherent in formulating general principles on a 
case-by-case basis. The considerable internal inconsistency in the opinions of the 
Court derives from what, in retrospect, may have been too sweeping utterances on 
aspects of these clauses that seemed clear in relation to particular cases but have 
limited meaning as general principles. 
Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970). It has been suggested that the Nyquist 
formulation is too rigid even for the area in which it has developed, and that its future 
is "problematic." Note, A. Workable Definition of the Establishment Clause, 62 GEo. 
L.J. 1461, 1481 (1974). 
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exemption for religious groups from a state compulsory secondary 
education law. Examinations of the extent to which the exemption 
furthers the evils at which the establishment clause was directed and 
the extent to which the exemption furthers the values underlying 
the establishment clause afford alternative modes of analyzing 
alleged establishment clause infringement. 
The Supreme Court has identified the evils at which the estab-
lishment clause was directed as "sponsorship, financial support, and 
active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity."1i0 The 
exemption avoids the third evil by excluding religious organizations 
from governmental regulation as far as religious discrimination is 
concerned. The King's Garden court, however, seemed to imply 
that the title VII exemption does constitute financial support of 
religion. 57 Certainly, the exemption does not provide direct financial 
aid to religious organizations. But it is not clear that the exemption 
confers no indirect economic benefits. Because under the exemption 
religious organizations can engage in discrimination that is for-
bidden to secular employers, it is possible that the exemption con-
fers some competitive advantage on such organizations. 
The religion of a business' employees, like their race, is generally 
economically irrelevant.58 A business that discriminates according 
to economically irrelevant criteria does not thereby gain a competi-
tive advantage.59 There are, however, several ways in which the 
ability to discriminate according to religion in hiring might be com-
mercially relevant. 
One financial benefit the exemption may confer on religious 
institutions is relief from the title VII duty imposed on secular 
employers to make reasonable accommodation for the religious 
practices of employees if such accommodation can be made without 
56. Committee for Pub. Educ. 8: Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772 
(1973), quoting Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970). 
57. The rourt emphasized sponsorship rather than financial support, but its con-
cern over the danger of "extending the worldly influence" of wealthy sects suggests 
that it believed the exemption to ronfer some financial advantages. 498 F.2d at 55. 
58. Employee and customer religious prejudices might influence the success of a 
business, but these factoxs are not themselves strictly "rommercial," and the congres-
sional hearings on title VII revealed no evidence that such factoxs do influence an en• 
terprise's business success. The diversity of American religious beliefs makes it unlikely 
that they would. 
An organization able to hire only employees of a particular religion might also 
benefit from increased worker productivity because the workexs believe they are work-
ing for a "higher" goal in the good of their religion. If there is such a benefit, how-
ever, it arises not from the differential impact of title VII but from the different 
natures of secular and religious institutions. The exemption enables religious institu-
tions to retain the benefit, if any, but it does not create it. In any case, it is unlikely 
that religion rorrelates so significantly with worker capability as to make it worth• 
while for an employer to use religion as a hiring test rather than tests that directly 
measure job-related capabilities, 
59. See G. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 14, 19-38 (2d ed. 1971). 
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causing undue hardship with respect to the conduct of the em-
ployer's business.60 Language making reasonable accommodation 
an explicit requirement of the title VII duty not to discriminate 
on the basis of religion was added in 1972,61 at the same time 
that the exemption for religious organizations was broadened. 
The requirement was added to express Congress' intent to forbid 
not only intentional discrimination but all employer requirements 
without reasonable commercial justification that have the effect of 
discrimination because they conflict with actions required by the 
faith of one or more religious groups.62 It is unclear whether title 
VII implicitly contained the requirement of reasonable accommoda-
tion before the 1972 amendment.63 -
The cases concerning employees who refused to work on Friday 
nights or Saturday because they observe their Sabbath at that time64 
indicate that the courts have been unwilling to interpret the 1972 
amendment to impose any substantial financial burden on employers 
or any hardship on the workers' fellow employees. If the employer 
cannot schedule another employee to replace the Saturday Sabbath 
observer, the hardship to the employer will probably be deemed 
60, The reasonable accommodation requirement is contained in title VIl's defini-
tion of religion as including "all aspects of religious observance and practices, as well 
as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommo-
date to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice without 
undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business." 42 U.S.C. § 2000eG) (Supp. 
II, 1972), 
61. Act of March 24, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 2000-e(j) (Supp. II, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e (1970). 
62. My own pastor in this area ••• has expressed his concern and distress that 
there are certain faiths that are having a very difficult time, especially with the 
younger people, and understandably so, with reference to a possible inability of 
employers on some occasions to adjust work schedules to fit the requirements of 
the faith of some of their workers. 
The term "religion" as used in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 encompasses, as I 
understand it, the same concepts as are included in the first amendment - not 
merely belief, but also conduct; the freedom to believe and also the freedom to 
act. 
118 CONG, R.Ec. 705 (1972) (remarks of Senator Randolph) (emphasis added). Senator 
Randolph was the sponsor of the reasonable accommodation amendment. His com-
plaint about employer "inability'' to adjust work schedules, rather than "unwilling-
ness" to adjust them or "difficulty" in adjusting them, seems to indicate that undue 
hardship was not intended to be an easily satisfied defense. 
63. Compare Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), afjd. by 
an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971), with Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 
1113 (5th Cir. 1972). 
64. There are other ways in which an employee's religious beliefs or practices might 
conflict with employment requirements. See, e.g., Yott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 
501 F.2d 398 (9th Cir. 1974) (conflict with payment of union dues); Dec. No. 71-2620 
(1971), CCH EEOC DEC. ,i 6283 (1973) (conflict with employer dress codes); Eastern 
Greyhound Lines Div. of Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 27 
N.Y.2d 279, 265 N.E.2d 745, 317 N.Y.S.2d 322 (1970) (conflict with employer proscrip-
tion against beards). 
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"undue."65 On the other hand, where there are open positions re-
quiring no Saturday work to which the Saturday Sabbath observer 
can be shifted without violating seniority rules or forcing the em-
ployer to pay overtime, employer refusal to make such an accom-
modation has been held unreasonable.66 Similarly, burdens on man-
agerial time necessitated by the rescheduling of employees' work 
periods have been held not to be undue hardships.67 But no accom-
modation has been required where it could be accomplished only 
by a violation of other employees' seniority rights, 68 or where the result 
would be either to leave the Saturday work crew shorthanded or to 
force the employer to pay premium wages to a substitute.00 One 
district court has stated that "[t]itle VII cannot be interpreted to 
require that companies :finance employee's [sic] religious beliefs."70 
Although one case has held that an employer's refusal to accommo-
date is unreasonable despite the possibility that accommodation 
would lead to adverse effects on employee morale or the necessity 
of paying additional overtime to a substitute,71 that case may have 
been based on a :finding that the defendant's evidence had not 
demonstrated such hardships.72 
The tendency of the courts to limit the employer accommoda-
tion required by title VII to actions not involving :financial hardship 
or violation of employee seniority rights may not fully implement 
the intent of Congress to strengthen title VII's ban on religious 
discrimination.78 However, the establishment clause may prohibit 
a rule that falls more harshly upon employers or fellow workers.74 
A statute that forces hardships on others in order to enhance the 
65. See, e.g., Dec. No. 70-773 (1970), CCH EEOC DECISIONS ,I 6154 (1973); 29 C.F,R, 
§ 1605.l(b) (1974). Cf. MA.s.s. ANN. LAws ch. 151B, § 4.lA (Supp. 1974). 
66. Shaffield v. Northrup Worldwide Aircraft Servs., Inc., 373 F. Supp. 937 (M.D, 
Ala. 1974); Claybaugh v. Pacific Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 355 F. Supp. 1 (D. Ore. 1973). 
67. Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 369 F. Supp. 684 (W.D. Tenn. 1973), 
68. Johnson v. United States Postal Serv., 497 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1974); Hardison v. 
Trans World Airlines, 375 F. Supp. 877 ()N .D. Mo. 1974). But see Edwards &: Kaplan, 
supra note 41, at 628 (arguing that reasonable accommodation unwisely requires the 
employer to ignore the rights of other employees). 
69. Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, 375 F. Supp. 877 (;,V .D. Mo. 1974), Cf. Pow-
ell v. Chicago Transit Authority, 2 CCH EMPL, PRAc. GUIDE ,I 5139 (Ill. Fair Empl. 
Prac. Commn., Feb. 20, 1973), 
70. Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, 375 F. Supp. 877, 891 (;,V.D. Mo. 1974). 
71, Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 369 F. Supp. 684 (;,V .D. Tenn. 1973). 
72, The burden of proving undue hardship is on the employer. 29 C.F.R, § 1605,l(c) 
(1974). 
73. See the remarks of Senator Randolph quoted note 62 supra. 
74. Doubts over the reasonable accommodation standard's constitutionality strongly 
influenced the decisions in Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co., 429 F.2d 324, 334.35 (6th 
Cir. 1970), afjd. by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971), and Hardison v. 
Trans World Airlines, 375 F. Supp. 877, 882·83 (;,V .D. Mo, 1974). The constitutional 
argument is developed in Edwards &: Kaplan, supra note 41, at 628, 
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ability of some employees to observe their Sabbath on Saturday 
prefers religious reasons for not working on Saturday over nonreli-
gious reasons, such as wanting to play golf or to be with one's 
family.75 By imposing financial hardship on employers or requiring 
infringement of fellow workers' seniority rights, the state requires 
these parties in effect to finance the religious practi~es of some em-
ployees, in violation of the establishment clause.76 Although deci-
sions under the establishment clause have come to be characterized 
by an attitude of "benevolent neutrality," which permits some 
accommodation to and preferment of religion in order to safeguard 
free exercise values,77 it is not clear that this approach should apply 
to the reasonable accommodation requirement of title VII. Benevo-
lent neutrality allows a legislature some discretion in navigating 
between the competing demands that the free exercise and establish-
ment clauses make on government.78 Thus, the decisions expressing 
this attitude have usually involved religious exemption from gov-
ernment-imposed duties.79 The title VII requirement of reasonable 
accommodation, however, aims only at preventing discrimination 
by private individuals. I~ does not have a free exercise basis because 
the free exercise clause restricts only governmental interference with 
the practice of religion. so There is therefore no need to adopt a 
flexible attitude toward the accommodation requirement under the 
establishment clause because countervailing free. exercise considera-
tions are not present.81 
75. This establishment problem would disappear if one defined all such desires, at 
least if they are strongly held, as "religious." See Hollingsworth, Constitutional Reli-
gious Protection: Antiquated Oddity or Vital Reality, 34 Omo ST. L.J. 15, 76-77 (1973). 
76. See text at note 56 supra. 
77. See text at note 130 infra. 
78. See text at note 142 infra. 
79. E.g., Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664 (1970); United States v. Branigan, 299 
F. Supp. 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). See Kauper, The Walz Decision: More on the Religion 
Clauses of the First Amendment, 69 MICH. L. REv. 179, 198 (1970). 
80. Justice Douglas has characterized the first amendment as containing the "com-
mand ••• that no one need bow to the religious beliefs of another." McGowan v. 
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 575 (1961) (dissenting opinion). See United States Natl. Bank 
v. Snodgrass, 202 Ore. 530, 543, 275 P.2d 860, 866 (1954); Ginsberg v. Yeshiva of Far 
Rockaway, 45 App. Div. 2d 334, 358 N.Y.S.2d 477 (1974). But cf. Marsh v. Alabama, 
326 U.S. 501 (1946). Marsh did use the free exercise clause as a restraint on the con-
duct of a private party, but only because that party performed "essentially a public 
!unction," 326 U.S. at 506, and availed itself of state criminal laws. 
81. However, Senator Williams, floor manager of the Equal Employment Opportu-
nities Act of 1972, thought that the reasonable accommodation requirement was con-
sistent with the Constitution because it promoted free exercise. See 118 CoNG. REc. 
706 (1972). Thus one might argue that the reasonable accommodation requirement 
does have a constitutional basis. See Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d .1227 (8th Cir. 1971) 
(en bane). Cf. Sossin Sys., Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 262 S.2d 28 (Fla. App. 1972) 
(upholding against establishment clause challenge a criminal statute prohibiting the 
fraudulent representation of nonkosher food as kosher because statute promotes free 
exercise). But see People v. Goldberger, 35 N.Y. Crim. 328, 331-36, 168 N.Y.S. 578, 
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Other burdens imposed on secular employers by title VII that 
the broadened exemption may spare to religious employers are 
litigation costs and penalties for noncompliance, including back-pay 
awards.82 Of course, secular employers need not violate the statute, 
but even full compliance by a secular employer does not guarantee 
immunity from claims of religious discrimination. However, the 
provision of title VII giving the courts discretion to award attor-
ney's fees to the prevailing party83 should reduce these costs. More-
over, because of doubts about the constitutionality of the title VII 
exemption, as expressed in King's Garden, even religious employers 
may not be exempt from litigation costs associated with the title VII 
ban on religious discrimination. 
Although the title VII exemption may confer an indirect eco-
nomic benefit on religious organizations, especially with regard to 
litigation costs and the requirement of reasonable accommodation, 
such benefits are too speculative to constitute the evil of financial 
support. Even the conferral of definite indirect economic benefits 
on religion is not always unconstitutional according to Walz v. Tax 
Commission,84 which upheld a tax exemption for church-owned real 
property.85 
The arguments that the title VII exemption sponsors religion 
likewise seems weak. Sponsorship is the official sanctioning of a 
particular religion, or of religion in general. It lends to religion 
"a character of orthodoxy and acceptability," which in tum helps 
seduce conscience "both from irreligion and the t~achings of rival 
groups."86 The King's Garden court concluded that the title VII 
exemption was tainted by sponsorship because it gives religious 
groups preferential treatment in the imposition of a general statu-
tory burden. 87 
In reaching this conclusion, the court apparently relied on 
Reitman v. Mulkey,88 in which the Supreme Court overturned a 
California constitutional amendment that guaranteed citizens a 
580-83 (Spec. Sess. 1916) (Freschi, J., dissenting) (statute prohibiting fraudulent reprc• 
scntation of nonkosher food as kosher could be upheld without resort to free exercise 
clause); Note, Enforceability of Religious Law in Secular Courts-It's Kosher, But Is 
It Constitutional?, 71 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1641, 1651-53 (1973). 
The constitutionality of the reasonable accommodation standard was upheld against 
an establishment clause challenge, without resort to the free exercise clause, in Hardison 
v. Trans World Airlines, 375 F. Supp. 877 (W .D. Mo. 1974). 
82. See, e.g., Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 369 F. Supp. 684 (!,V .D. Tenn. 1973). 
83. 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-5(k) (1970). 
84. 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
85. See text at notes 99-100 infra. 
86. Note, Toward a Uniform Evaluation of the Religion Guarantees, 80 YALE L.J. 
77, 85 (1970) (speaks of "sanctioning" instead of "sponsorship'} 
87. 498 F.2d at 55. 
88. 387 U.S. 369 (1967). 
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right to discriminate on racial grounds in the sale or rental of 
residential real estate. Although California was not bound by the 
federal Constitution to forbid private discrimination,89 the con-
stitutional authorization was held to constitute state encouragement 
of discrimination.90 This encouragement involved the state in pri-
vate racial discrimination91 and hence amounted to unconstitutional 
state action.92 By analogy to Reitman, it could be argued that the 
title VII exemption encourages religion in violation of the establish-
ment clause by placing the prestige of state approval behind reli-
gious groups. 
This argument is weak for several reasons. First, it seems un-
likely that an exemption from a proscription on religious discrim-
ination enhances the prestige of religion. Second, it is not clear that 
the title VII exemption is sufficiently similar to the constitutional 
amendment involved in Reitman for that case to be controlling.93 
A third and more important flaw in the analogy is that the 1972 
title VII exemption protects-at least at its core-rights that come 
within the free exercise clause,94 whereas the California constitu-
tional amendment permitting racial discrimination protected acts 
that were not guaranteed protection by the federal Constitution.95 To 
the extent that the title VII exemption goes beyond the minimum 
requirements of the free exercise clause, it too may lack a constitu-
tional basis. However, because of the difficulty in determining with 
precision how much of an exemption the free exercise clause re-
quires, the enactment of the exemption might as well be viewed as 
an attempt to comply with the Constitution in an unclear area of 
the law as governmental sponsorship of religion. Furthermore, 
special treatment for religion beyond the requirements of the Con-
stitution is not necessarily sponsorship. In Walz v. Tax Commis-
sion96 a property tax exemption for church-owned real property was 
held not to confer government sponsorship upon religion,97 despite 
the fact that the Court did not hold that the exemption was required 
by the free exercise clause. It might be argued that Walz involved a 
lesser degree of government approval than the title VII exemption 
because religious institutions were not singled out for separate treat-
ment but rather formed part of a larger class receiving the tax 
89. 387 U.S. at 374-75. 
90. 387 U.S. at 375. 
91. 387 U.S. at 378-79. 
92. 387 U.S. at 375. 
93. See text preceding note 106 infra. 
94. See text at notes 22-34 supra. 
95. Cf. King, Rebuilding the "Fallen House"-Tuition Grants for Elementary and 
Secondary Education, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1057, 1087-88 (1971). 
96. 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
97. 397 U.S. at 675. 
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benefit.98 However, it can also be argued that the Walt situation 
comes closer to sponsorship. The Court assumed that the Walz 
exemption conferred an indirect economic benefit on churches,00 
but it was not sponsorship because it involved no direct economic 
benefit.100 If the distinction between direct and indirect benefit was 
sufficient to avoid classifying the Walz exemption as sponsorship, it 
is difficult to see how the title VII exemption, which involves at most 
very minor indirect economic benefits,101 can be guilty of this evil. 
Thus the broadened title VII exemption for religious organiza-
tions does not seem to further to a substantial degree any of the evils 
at which the establishment clause is aimed. 
Another method of approaching establishment clause questions 
is to ask whether the law in question infringes on any of the values 
that various authorities have identified as those the establishment 
clause was designed to protect. Professor Schwarz has identified "no 
imposition of religion" as the core establishment clause value.102 
Under this view, the establishment clause protects individual and 
family determinations of religious choice from governmental inter-
ference.103 The title VII exemption is consistent with this value. 
The possible financial advantages to be gained by being able to dis-
criminate with respect to religion in hiring are too uncertain to 
influence entrepreneurs to become religious and to change their 
enterprises into religious corporations. Even if there were monetary 
gain to be derived from religious discrimination, or even if the 
psychic rewards of discriminating are strong enough to induce entre-
preneurs to adopt the form of a religious association, the exemption 
would not "impose" religion on anyone because the "no imposi-
tion" value is not concerned with false claims of belief, only with 
induced belief.104 The prospective employee of a discriminating 
religious organization, who would have to adopt a religion or forgo 
an employment opportunity, might be influenced in his religious 
choice, but any such imposition would be by the discriminating 
private employer and not by the government. It might be argued, 
98. 397 U.S. at 696-97 (Harlan, J., concurring). However, the property tax exemp• 
tion has been viewed as a special preference for religious groups. E.g., A. BALK, TH£ 
FREE Lrsr 28-44 (1971); M. LARsoN &: c. LOWELL, THE CHURCHES: THEIR RICHES, REvE-
NUES AND lMMUNITIES (1969). 
99. 397 U.S. at 674, 690 (Brennan, J., concurring), 699 (Harlan, J., concurring), 704 
(Douglas, J., dissenting). But see Bittker, Churches, Taxes and the Constitution, 78 
YALE L.J. 1285 (1969). 
100. 397 U.S. at 675. 
IOI. See text at notes 58-83 supra. 
102. Schwarz, The Nonestablishment Prindple: A Reply to Professor Giannella, 81 
HARV. L. REv. 1465 (1968); Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion: The Establishment 
Clause Value, 77 YALE L.J. 692 (1968). 
103. Schwarz, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1465, supra note 102, at 1465. 
104. Schwarz, 77 YALE L.J., supra note 102, at 724-25. 
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on the strength of Reitman, that government permission for limited 
private imposition of religion is the equivalent of state imposition 
of religion. This argument is inconsistent ·with the view, conceded 
by the Kinfts Garden court, that the religion clauses of the Consti-
tution do not require Congress to enact a general ban on religious 
discrimination.105 It can also be argued from Reitman that repeal of 
a law prohibiting certain private discrimination involves the state 
more deeply in discrimination than would have been the case if 
the state had never enacted the law in the first place. The state con-
stitutional amendment in Reitman permitting private discrimina-
tion in the sale or rental of private housing had the effect of 
repealing California's fair housing laws. Similarly, the 1972 broaden-
ing of the title VII exemption effectively repealed the earlier ban 
on religious discrimination by religious organizations in their non-
religious activities. Some might view this repeal as state involvement 
in religious imposition by religious employers, even though the 
state is not constitutionally required to enact a general ban on 
religious discrimination. However, in Reitman California's fair 
housing acts were not merely repealed by a change in state statutes; 
the change was effected by amendment of the state constitution, an 
action that insulated the change from reversal through the normal 
political processes.106 Finally, it is doubtful that the Reitman rea-
soning should be extended in the area of the title VII exemption, 
where the legislature is caught between the conflicting demands of 
the religion clauses.101 
Another commentator has urged that the establishment clause, 
in conjunction with the free exercise clause, protects free adoption, 
observance, and propagation of religion.108 To the extent that these 
values are equivalent to Professor Schwarz's no imposition value, 
the foregoing discussion shows that the title VII exemption is not 
inconsistent with them. However, this formulation leads to a much 
broader reading of the establishment clause than that suggested by 
Professor Schwarz. For example, aid that merely deepens rather than 
105. 498 F.2d at 55. 
106. The Supreme Court emphasized that the law struck down in Reitman was an 
amendment to the California Constitution. 387 U.S. at 377. See also, e.g., Black, Fore-
word: "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, The Supreme 
Court 1966 Term, 81 HARV. L. REv. 69, 73-79 (1967). A further factual distinction be-
tween Reitman and the title VII exemption is that the amendment struck down in 
Reitman was actually aimed at blacks and other minority groups. Black, supra, at 82. 
The title VII amendment does not work to the disadvantage of any particular religion, 
nor was it intended to do so. 
107. See text at note 94 supra. For analyses of the weakness of the state action ar-
gument, see Karst & Horowitz, Rietman v. Mulkey: A Teleophase of Substantive Equal 
Protection, 1967 SUP. Cr. R.Ev. 39; White, The Abolition of Self-Help Repossession: 
The Poor Pay Even More, 1973 WIS. L. REv. 503, fi05. 
108. Note, supra note 86. 
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induces faith would be unconstitutional under this theory because it 
would interfere with the rights of others not to have their prose-
lytization efforts frustrated by governmental action.100 A religious 
group that may permissibly provide jobs for its members, and no 
others, may succeed in intensifying the religious beliefs of its mem-
bers by reducing their contacts with nonbelievers. However, as 
argued above with respect to imposition of religion, one can argue 
that the intensification of religious belief in this situation is caused 
by private action, and not by governmental permission. 
Perhaps the two values most frequently mentioned as being at 
the heart of the establishment clause are "voluntarism" and "neu-
trality."110 Voluntarism requires that the state neither encourage 
nor discourage participation in religious life.111 An exemption for 
religious organizations from a general proscription on religious 
discrimination would not seem to infringe on this value because the 
resultant encouragement, if any, would not be state action.112 
More difficult is the question whether the exemption is in con-
formance with the value of neutrality. Neutrality has been called 
"a notoriously difficult concept";113 it was the basis of the court's 
decision in King's Garden.114 The court apparently applied the 
"strict neutrality" standard advocated by Professor Kurland.110 Ac-
cording to Kurland, ''the proper construction of the religion clauses 
of the first amendment is that the freedom and separation clauses 
should be read as a single precept that government cannot utilize 
109. Id. at 92 n.73. Such aid would be allowed by Professor Schwarz. Schwarz, 77 
YALE L.J. 692, supra note 102, at 724-25. 
110. E.g., Walz v. Tax: Commn,, 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
111. Walz v. Tax: Commn., 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
112. Cf. text following note 104 supra. 
113. King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51, 56 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43 
U.S.L.W. 3274 (U.S. Nov. 11, 1974). 
114. 498 F,2d at 55-57. 
115. See 498 F-2d at 56-57. The court also discussed cases applying a "benevolent 
neutrality" standard, see text at notes 128-30 infra, but thought they were "isolated 
decisions creat[ing] no precedent." 498 F.2d at 56. 
Professor Kurland refers to his standard as a "neutral principle," P. KURLAND, 
RELIGION AND THE LAw 15 (1962), and as "the neutrality principle," Kurland, The Su-
preme Court, Compulsory Education, and the First Amendment's Religion Clauses, 75 
W. VA. L. REv. 213, 237 (1973). There is wide agreement that "neutrality" is a goal 
of the establishment clause, but there is no widely accepted definition of the term, 
CJ. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 372 (1970) (White, J., dissenting) (strict ncu• 
trality not required by first amendment because first amendment makes religious classi-
fication); w. KATZ, RELIGION AND .AMmuCAN CoNSTITUTIONS passim (1964). According to 
at least one commentator, the Supreme Court, although continuing to invoke the 
"neutrality" concept, has deprived it of any significant content, Kauper, The Supreme 
Court and the Establishment Clause: Back to Everson?, 25 CAsE W. REs. L. REv, 107, 
126 (1974). Kurland's neutrality test is now generally referred to as "strict neutrality." 
Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development: Part 11, 
The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L. REV. 513, 513 (1968); Kauper, supra note 
79, at 198. 
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religion as a standard for action or inaction because these clauses 
prohibit classification in terms of religion either to confer a benefit 
or to impose a burden."116 The prime virtue of the strict neutrality 
test is that it promotes certainty and equality in the law.117 Because 
the broadened title VII exemption "obviously creates a classification 
of a strictly religious character,"118 it is inconsistent with strict 
neutrality and therefore supposedly unconstitutional.119 
Although Justice Harlan adopted the Kurland position,120 it has 
been rejected by the Court as a whole,121 as Professor Kurland has 
himself acknowledged.122 The rejection of the strict neutrality prin-
ciple has been most evident in cases that involve exemptions from 
generally imposed duties for religiously motivated activities.123 For 
example, in Wisconsin v. Yoder124 the Court held that a state must 
grant the Amish an exemption from compulsory school attendance, 
and in Sherbert v. Verner125 the Court decided that a state must 
carve out for Seventh Day Adventists and other Saturday Sabbath 
observers an exemption to the requirement that those seeking un-
employment compensation benefits be available for work on Satur-
days. Thus, the establishment clause must apparently give way when 
116. P. KURLAND, supra note 115, at 18. 
117. Id. at II2. 
118. King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51, 57 (D.C. Cir, 1974), cert. denied, 43 
U.S.L.W. 3274 (U.S. Nov. 11, 1974). 
119. Professor Kurland has warned that his principle should not be applied me• 
chanically, P. KURLAND, supra note 115, at 18, 112, but he has not specified under what 
circumstances it should not be applied. 
120. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 356-61 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); 
Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). See Kauper, supra 
note 79, at 198. 
121. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Gillette v. United States, 401 
U.S. 437 (1971); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 372 (1970) (White, J., dissenting); 
Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); 
Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 608 (1961); Commonwealth v. Arlan's Dept. Store, 
357 S.W .2d 708 (Ky.), appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal question 
sub nom. Arlan's Dept. Store v. Kentucky, 371 U.S. 218 (1962). The rejection of Kur-
land's theory has been noted by the commentators. E.g., Kauper, supra note 79, at 
198-200; Note, Voucher Systems of Public Education After Nyquist and Sloan: Can a 
Constitutional System Be Devised?, 72 MICH, L. REv. 895, 897-98 (1974). 
122. Kurland, supra note 115, at 237. 
123. See United States v. Branigan, 299 F. Supp. 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); People v. 
Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal, Rptr. 69 (1964); In re Jenison, 267 Minn. 
136, 125 N.W .2d 588 (1963); cases cited note 121 supra. But cf. Reynolds v. United 
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (rejecting claim that Mormon belief in polygamy is defense 
to bigamy prosecution). 
124. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). The Court stated that it "must not ignore the danger that 
an exception from a general obligation of citizenship on religious grounds may run 
afoul of the Establishment Clause, but that danger cannot be allowed to prevent any 
exception no matter how vital it may be to the protection of values promoted by the 
right of free exercise." 406 U.S. at 220. 
125. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Sherbert is not easily reconcilable with earlier establish-
ment clause cases. 374 U.S. at 416 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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it conflicts with the "favored child of the first amendment,"126 the 
free exercise clause.127 
Moreover, neutrality has been held to permit exemptions for 
religious groups or religiously motivated activities in instances in 
which an exemption is not required by the free exercise clause.128 
Walz v. Tax Commission,129 in which the Court upheld a property 
tax exemption for churches, employed a "benevolent neutrality" 
test, which permits some "play in the joints" between the two reli-
gion clauses of the first amendment.130 The result in Walz is not in-
consistent with strict neutrality because the exemption was also ex-
tended to nonprofit institutions generally.131 But the Court has also 
upheld exemptions that did not have broader, nonreligious aspects. 
For example, the Court has upheld the conscientious objector pro-
vision of the draft law against the argument that it established those 
religions or religious beliefs that opposed all wars, not just unjust 
wars,132 and the Court refused to strike down a "released time" pro-
gram, which exempted students from class attendance provided they 
received religious instruction during the released time:133 While the 
Court has not required an exemption from Sunday closing laws for 
Saturday Sabbath observers,134 it has indicated that such an exemp-
tion is not constitutionally forbidden.136 
Given that the neutrality principle allows some "play in the 
joints" even where free exercise values do not defeat an establish-
ment clause challenge, it is relevant to consider the important 
interests served by the broadened title VII exemption. The exemp-
tion would protect religious institutions from the indignities of 
126. Pfeffer, The Supremacy of Free Exercise, 61 GEO. L.J. 1115, 1142 (1973). 
127. One commentator would explain this result on the ground that resolution of 
the conflict between the religion clauses "requires a value judgment as to which (of 
the religion clauses] is to become dominant when there is a conflict-the one premised 
on a vital civil right [the free exercise clause], or the one premised on an outmoded 
eighteenth century political theory (the establishment clause]." Giannella, supra note 
37, at 1389. 
128. See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 299 (1963) 
(Brennan, J., concurring) (dictum); Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 598 (1942) (dictum), 
_revd. on rehearing, 319 U.S. 103 (1943); Shetreet, supra note 29, at 405. 
129. 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
130. 397 U.S. at 669; Kauper, supra note 79, at 198. 
131. 397 U.S. at 696 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
132. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971). It is not clear whether the con• 
scientious objector provision is a required exemption or merely a permissible one. 
Shetreet, supra note 29, at 405-06. 
133. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 
134-. See Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). But cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 
U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Kurland, supra note 115, at 244, 
135. See Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 608 (1961); Commonwealth v, Arlan's 
Dept. Store, 357 S.W.2d 708 (Ky.), appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal 
question sub nom. Arlan's Dept. Store v. Kentucky, 371 U.S. 218 (1962). Contra, City 
of Shreveport v. Levy, 26 La. Ann. 671 (1874). 
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being unfairly accused of bias and of having their employment prac-
tices examined unnecessarily by the courts.136 A rule that religious 
institutions are not subject to the religious discrimination provi-
sions of title VII is more certain than a rule that would accommo-
date what has been suggested as the minimum required by the free 
exercise clause-an exemption for a religious organization when its 
religiously discriminatory hiring practices are founded on a desire 
to further the. exercise or spread of its faith.137 The minimum 
exemption may or may not cover many activities. Uncertainty will 
breed litigation, and the fear of court review invited by the mini-
mum exemption might have a "chilling effect"138 on the exercise of 
religious liberty that could be avoided by the broader exemption.139 
The mechanics of applying the benevolent neutrality principle 
have not been clearly set out by the courts or commentators. There 
are at least three possible approaches to reconciling the competing 
requirements of the religion clauses of the Constitution. One would 
be to grant the legislature wide discretion by applying the estab-
lishment clause tests in a nonrigorous fashion, reserving them in 
effect only to correct gross legislative abuses.140 Another possible 
approach would be to determine the free exercise values and the 
degree of establishment clause infringement separately for each case, 
weighing them against each other on a scale weighted in favor of 
free exercise values. Finally, free exercise values could be imported 
directly and candidly into the establishment clause test by recog-
nizing the purpose and effect of preserving free exercise as satisfying 
the secular purpose and primary effect prongs, respectively, of the 
Nyquist standard.141 This final approach probably leads to the same 
results as the first suggested approach; the purpose and effect of 
giving wide berth to the demands of the free exercise clause would 
fail to satisfy the two critical prongs of the Nyquist standard only 
if the legislature has grossly abused its discretion. The balancing 
test will also lead to similar results, because only a gross violation 
of the establishment clause will overcome the presumption in favor 
136. Cf. Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull 
Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathe• 
dral, 344 U.S. 745 (1966); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871). 
137. See text at notes 20-34 supra. · 
138. Cf. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 485-87 (1965). 
139. However, in view of the ease with which a religious organization could prob-
ably show a religious purpose behind its employment discrimination, at least where 
the exercise of its religion really is involved, it is arguable that the minimum exemp-
tion would involve no significant "chilling effect." 
140. Compare Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664 (1970), and United States v. Braii-
igan, 299 F. Supp. 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), with Committee for Pub. Educ. 8: Religious 
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). 
141. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 452 (1971); text following notes 46, 
51 supra. 
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of free exercise. Indeed, granting the legislature wide discretion 
seems a fitting result under benevolent neutrality if, as has been 
suggested, the purpose of the doctrine is to relieve the legislature 
of the necessity of charting a tortuous course between the Scylla of 
free exercise and the Charybdis of establishment.142 
Thus under benevolent neutrality, no matter how applied, the 
1972 version of the title VII exemption should be upheld. The 
manner in which the exemption violates the establishment clause is 
not clear, nor are the requirements of the free exercise clause so 
sharply delineated that one can determine with assurance the extent 
to which the 1972 exemption is required by the free exercise clause. 
Congress' judgment on the proper scope of the exemption should 
therefore be respected.148 
142. W. KATZ, supra note 115, at 75, 
143. This analysis of the constitutional validity of the title VII exemption also ii· 
luminates several interpretative issues that may arise under the present exemption. One 
obvious issue is the scope of the phrase "religious corporation, association, educational 
institution, or society," 42 U.S.C. § 2000e--l (Supp. II, 1972), to which the exemption 
applies. In light of the 1972 amendment, it seems clear that Congress did not intend 
to limit the phrase to associations formed for the sole purpose of effectuating religious 
ideals. Even before the 1972 amendment, the Equal Employment Opportunity Com• 
mission bad construed the exemption to apply to a religious hospital. Dec. No. 70-332 
(1969), CCH EEOC DECISIONS 1J 6080 (1973). However, the discussion of the free ex• 
ercise basis for the exemption suggests that the religious purposes of an organization 
should have to be significant in relation to its other goals in order for the organization 
to come within the exemption. 
In evaluating the significance of an organization's religious goals, it will be neces-
sary to decide what sort of belief systems are "religious." The courts seem inclined to 
give the term a broad meaning. E.g., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); 
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11 
(1961); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied because 
petition not timely filed, 409 U.S. 896 (1972); Remmers v. Brewer, 361 F. Supp. 537 
(S.D. Iowa 1973), affd., 494 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 43 U.S.L,W. 3274 (U.S. 
Nov. 11, 1974); Cowen v. Lily Dale Assembly, 44 App. Div. 2d 772, 354 N.Y.S.2d 269 
(1974). A broad interpretation is necessary to avoid aggravating establishment clause 
problems. 
The exemption also fails to state clearly whether it authorizes religious discrim• 
ination in employment by religious organizations only if the discrimination is in favor 
of a member of the organization's faith or whether it also permits the organization to 
hire adherents of a second religion over those of a third. See note 3 supra. Cf. 
MAss. LAWS ANN, ch. 151B, § 1.5 (Supp. 1974); ORE. REv. STAT, § 659.020(2) (1974), 
The probable intent of Congress was to allow religious organizations to discrimi• 
nate against particular religious or irreligious persons without discriminating 
against all other faiths. See 118 CONG. REc. 4503 (1972) (remarks of Senator Ervin); 
EEOC, supra note 22, at 3208 (1968) (debate on exemption codified as 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e--2(e)(2) (1970), which contains the same language as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l (Supp, 
II, 1972)). Free exercise requirements reinforce this interpretation. For example, a sect 
might desire to protect the employees of its hospital who are members of the sect 
from constant proselytization during work. Therefore, without finding it desirable to 
discriminate against all other faiths, the sect might discriminate in its hiring against 
those religious groups whose members are required by their faith to proselytize, Simi· 
Iarly, it seems reasonable to interpret the exemption to permit a l\fissouri Synod Lu-
theran organization to blre other Lutherans before Catholics, and Catholics before 
atheists. 
